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I. INTRODUCTION 
The last few years have been stressful for investors, and 
perhaps no less so for corporate managers.  In March 2000, the 
 
 †  Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. 
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tech stock bubble burst, inflicting financial pain on corporate1 and 
middle2 America.  The following year, the public’s faith in the 
integrity of the financial markets was shaken when a scandal 
erupted regarding the integrity of research reports from securities 
analysts at several major brokerage firms.3  Later that year, Enron 
Corp. declared bankruptcy after revelations of financial 
manipulation and what appeared to be accounting fraud.4  The 
Enron disaster took with it one of the nation’s largest and most-
respected accounting firms, Arthur Andersen.5  More bad news 
soon began to surface about other large companies, including 
some that were recently the market’s biggest success stories, 
including Worldcom6 and Adelphia.7  In mid-2002, Congress 
 
       1.  For example, shortly before the bubble burst, America Online (“AOL”) 
had agreed to acquire Time Warner in a stock exchange.  When announced on 
January 10, 2000, the transaction was valued at $160 billion based on AOL’s stock 
price.  See Steven Lipkin & Kara Scannell, Deals & Deal Makers: The Deal, Week 2:  
Time Warner, Media Firms Look Like Winners, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2000, at C17.  After 
the bubble burst, the completed merger was worth just $106 billion.  A few years 
after the acquisition, AOL Time Warner changed its name back to Time Warner 
and the stock symbol from AOL to TWX, Time Warner’s symbol before the 
acquisition.  Recent Changes in Stock Listings, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2003, at C5. 
 2. Investor losses following the bubble’s burst are estimated at $3 trillion.  
Jonathon Clements, Getting Going, Learning Lessons from Market Losses, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 5, 2000, at C1.  The Wilshire Total Market Index would show a decline of 
more than $7 trillion between March 24, 2000 and July 18, 2002.  Joel Seligman, 
No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 449, 517 n.51 (2002) (citing Seth W. Feaster, The Incredible Shrinking Stock 
Market, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002, at 14). 
 3. See Steve Liesman et al., When Rules Keep Debt Off the Books, Enron Crisis Puts 
Spotlight on the FASB,  WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2002, at C1; Joel Seligman, No One Can 
Serve Two Masters:  Corporate and Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 
451 (2002); Robert Strauss, Investing; Asking Directions at Wall & Broad, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 1, 2001, § 3, at 12. 
 4. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron’s Collapse: The 
Overview; Enron Corp. Files Largest U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, 
at A1; Richard B. Schmitt, Fall of a Power Giant: Burst of Chapter 11 Filings Marks Big 
Year for the Bankruptcy Bar, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2001, at A10. 
 5. See Larry Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A 
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2002)  (“Arthur 
Anderson has been virtually shut down by its conviction for Enron-related 
obstruction of justice . . . .”); Robert Frank & Ken Brown, Andersen: Just a Shadow of 
Its Former Self, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2002, at C1. 
 6. See Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and 
the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 329, 333 (2003); Jared Sandberg et al., Worldcom Admits $3.8 Billion Error in 
Its Accounting, WALL ST. J., Jun. 26, 2002, at A1. 
 7. Frank C. Allen, Jr.,  Legal Compliance in Maritime Operations: Charting Your 
Course Through Stormy Waters—2003 and Beyond, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2003); 
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responded by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the “Act” 
or “SOX”).8  The Act’s principal objective was to restore faith in the 
financial markets chiefly by improving the reliability of issuer 
disclosure.9  To accomplish this goal, SOX established a board to 
oversee firms providing auditing services to public companies, 
required auditing firms to remain strictly independent of the 
companies they audit, increased the responsibilities of issuer audit 
committees, required certification of financial statements by 
management, specified additional and improved disclosure and 
financial reporting, prohibited certain activities by issuer 
management, created new financial crimes, and enhanced civil and 
criminal penalties for misdeeds already defined. 
Whether the goals of SOX will be accomplished only time will 
tell.10  What already is clear, however, is that it represents the 
farthest-reaching reform of federal securities law since the 
enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 
Act”).11  Indeed, SOX is not limited to federal securities law but, as 
we shall see, extends its reach to state corporation law as well.  As is 
common in securities law, large portions of the Act do not 
themselves create substantive regulation, but, rather, authorize the 
S.E.C. to adopt implementing rules.  At this writing, the S.E.C. has 
adopted rules addressing most areas under SOX, but more rules 
are pending.  This article will address only final rules the S.E.C. has 
adopted; it will not address proposed rules because the history of 
S.E.C. rulemaking reveals that rules often are substantially changed 
before being adopted. 
SOX covers all issuers—domestic and foreign—with securities 
registered under the 1934 Act section 12.12  It also covers issuers 
 
Jerry Markon & Peter Grant, Prosecutors to Seek Indictments of 5 Former Adelphia 
Executives, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2002, at A8. 
 8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (to 
be codified in scattered sections of  11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. and 
29 U.S.C.). 
 9. Id.  Preamble to Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 10. SOX did not succeed in preventing or inducing discontinuance of long-
standing abuses in the mutual fund industry, which came to light beginning in late 
2003. See Michael Schroeder, New Rules for Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2003, 
at D1 (discussing potential reforms resembling Sarbanes-Oxley). Deborah 
Solomon, SEC Chairman Defends Decision to Quickly Settle Putnam Charges, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 18, 2003, at D9 (describing criticism of the SEC for failing to uncover above 
in the fund industry sooner). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000). 
 12. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 2(a)(7), 116  Stat. at 747 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7201). Section 12 requires registration of securities that are traded on a national 
3
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required by section 15(d) of that Act to file reports, whether or not 
they have securities registered under section 12.13  Finally, SOX 
covers companies that file a registration statement under the 
Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”).14  In this article all such 
issuers are referred to simply as “issuers.” 
It is the goal of this article to provide a brief reference to the 
multitude of changes in the law wrought by SOX.  The author’s 
hope is that this will be of use to students, scholars, and 
practitioners seeking an overview of the extensive changes resulting 
from this legislation.  The discussion is broader than it is deep; 
indeed, a work attempting to examine SOX in depth would soon 
become a treatise and not just an article.  The remainder of this 
article, then, will seek to provide a big-picture view of SOX: Part II 
of this article will address SOX regulation of professionals, 
including accountants, lawyers, and securities analysts.  Part III will 
address SOX’s attempts to enhance corporate disclosure.  Part IV 
will examine SOX’s efforts to reform corporate governance.  Part V 
will examine SOX’s provisions dealing with enforcement of the law.  
Finally, Part VI will provide a brief conclusion. 
II. SOX REGULATION OF PROFESSIONALS 
The cornerstone of SOX is increased oversight of the 
accounting and legal professions, as well as some additional 
regulation of securities analysts.  Of these, the most dramatic 
changes are in the regulation of issuers’ accountants. 
A.  Regulation of Accountants 
Post-SOX, accountants are subject to regulation by the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board.  In addition, SOX 
prescribes detailed rules designed to ensure auditor independence 
from issuers. 
 
stock exchange or have reached a certain size in total assets and number of 
shareholders.  See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a), (b) (2000). 
 13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 2(a)(7), 116 Stat. at 747 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7201). 
 14. Id.  The 1933 Act generally requires persons proposing to offer securities 
to the public to file a registration statement with the S.E.C. prior to offering any of 
the securities. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)(c)(2000). 
4
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1.  Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
SOX establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board as a self-regulatory organization15 (“SRO”), similar in many 
respects to other SROs such as the New York Stock Exchange and 
the National Association of Securities Dealers.16  In addition, SOX 
prohibits certain relationships between auditors and their clients, 
discussed below,17 that might create a conflict of interest or provide 
a motive for the auditors to be less than exacting in their audit. 
Formally, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(the “Board”) is not an agency of the U.S. government; it is a 
nonprofit corporation18 organized under the District of Columbia 
Nonprofit Corporation Act.19  The Board comprises five members,20 
of which two must—and only two may—be certified public 
accountants.21  If the chair is a CPA, he or she may not have been 
practicing as such for at least five years before being appointed to 
the Board.22  Board members serve five-year terms, with one 
member’s term expiring each year.23  No member may serve more 
than two terms on the Board.24 
The duties of the Board include: registering public accounting 
firms that prepare audit reports for issuers; establishing standards 
for audit reports, including standards for auditing, quality control, 
ethics, independence, and others as the Board deems appropriate; 
inspecting registered accounting firms; investigating and 
 
 15. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 750 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7211). 
 16. The SROs design, implement and enforce their own rules after giving 
notice to and receiving comment from the S.E.C.  15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2000).  The 
SROs also enforce S.E.C. rules and regulations over brokers, dealers, and others. 
Id. § 78s(g).  In that respect, the SROs play an important role in diverting 
enforcement efforts from the overburdened S.E.C.  The S.E.C. maintains 
supremacy over the SROs by reserving authority to review the SROs rules, by 
requiring that the SROs provide the S.E.C. with notice of final disciplinary actions,  
and by hearing appeals from SRO decisions.  Id. § 78s. 
 17. See infra notes 40-57 and accompanying text. 
 18. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(b), 116 Stat. at 750 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7211). 
 19. Id.  See District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 
29-501-599.16 (1981 & Supp. 1995). 
 20. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(e)(1), 116 Stat. at 750 (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 7211). 
 21. Id. § 101(e)(2). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. § 101(e)(5)(A). 
 24. Id. § 101(e)(5)(B). 
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conducting disciplinary proceedings regarding registered 
accounting firms; enforcing SOX with respect to registered 
accounting firms; and doing such other things that the Board or 
the S.E.C. consider “necessary or appropriate to promote high 
professional standards among, and to improve the quality of audit 
services provided by, registered accounting firms.”25 
Any public accounting firm that wants to prepare or issue an 
audit report for an issuer (or even “participate in the preparation 
or issuance of” such a report) must register with the Board.26  An 
accounting firm’s application for registration must contain the 
accounting firm’s consent to cooperate with the Board and to 
produce documents and testimony to the Board, at the latter’s 
request, or risk having its registration revoked.27  In effect, this 
means that all issuers subject to SOX can be investigated by the 
Board, as documents produced by a registered accounting firm 
could (and probably would) relate to an audit report for an issuer. 
In furtherance of its mission, the Board is empowered to 
establish standards for auditing, certifying and conducting quality 
control regarding audits and ethics for public accounting firms.28  
SOX prescribes minimum standards, however, that the Board must 
establish.  With respect to audits, SOX mandates that audit work 
papers must be kept for at least seven years.29  In addition to the 
person in charge of the audit, a second person qualified under the 
Board’s rules (normally another person from the firm) must 
approve each audit report the registered accounting firm issues.30  
Finally, each audit report must include a report of the testing of the 
issuer’s internal control processes and procedures.31 
With respect to quality control of accounting and auditing 
standards, SOX requires the Board to establish standards 
addressing the monitoring of professional ethics and 
independence from audit clients; consultation regarding 
accounting and auditing questions within the firm; hiring, 
education, and promotion of personnel; agreeing to perform, and 
performance of, accounting and auditing services; and internal 
 
 25. Id. § 101(c). 
 26. Id. § 102(a), 116 Stat. at 753 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7212). 
 27. Id. § 102(b)(3). 
 28. Id. § 103(a)(3)(A), 116 Stat. at 755 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213). 
 29. Id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 30. Id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 31. Id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(ii). Regarding internal controls, see infra notes 107-110 
and accompanying text. 
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inspection and control.32 
In furtherance of its powers to regulate the accounting 
profession, the Board must conduct a program of inspections to 
ensure the registered firms are in compliance with SOX, the 
Board’s rules, the S.E.C.’s rules, and professional standards.33  The 
Board, in addition to its power to inspect, also has sweeping powers 
of investigation and discipline, related not only to violations of its 
own rules, but also to violations and suspected violations of the 
securities laws, the S.E.C.’s rules, and professional accounting 
standards.34  The Board may demand testimony and production of 
documents from registered firms or their client(s), and can seek a 
subpoena from the S.E.C. compelling testimony or production of 
documents if necessary.35  The Board may refer matters to the 
S.E.C., and, at the latter’s direction, to other authorities, including 
the Justice Department (for criminal violations).36  The Board has 
the power to impose discipline on registered firms and associated 
persons, if it finds a violation of applicable law, rules, or standards.37  
The nature of the discipline the Board may impose depends on the 
nature of the violation; the most severe violations (those 
categorized as “intentional” or “knowing”) can result in both a 
permanent bar from auditing issuers as well as substantial money 
penalties.38  Lesser violations may result in censure, mandatory 
training, money penalties, and other sanctions, as the Board 
determines.39 
2.  Auditor Independence 
In addition to establishing the Board, SOX contains detailed 
rules, designed to ensure auditors’ independence from their issuer 
clients.  Certain services by auditors are prohibited outright; those 
not prohibited are subject to pre-approval by the issuer’s 
independent audit committee.  Furthermore, audit partners (but, 
at this time, not audit firms) must rotate periodically, and the 
auditors must report to the audit committee, thereby enabling that 
 
 32. Id. § 103(a)(2)(B). 
 33. Id. § 104(a), 116 Stat. at 757 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7214). 
 34. Id. § 105(b)(1), 116 Stat. at 759 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7215). 
 35. Id. § 105(b)(2). 
 36. Id. § 105(b)(4)(B). 
 37. Id. § 105(c)(4). 
 38. Id. § 105(c)(4),(5). 
 39. Id. § 105(c)(4). 
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committee to monitor the relationship between management and 
the auditors.  Finally, the employment by the issuer of former 
auditor employees is limited. 
a.  Prohibited Services 
Congress was concerned that the financial scandals of 2001-02 
were caused partly because auditors had become too cozy with their 
clients.  SOX therefore contains provisions designed to ensure that 
auditors remain independent, so that audit reports represent an 
impartial conclusion regarding the accuracy of the clients’ financial 
statements. Of particular concern to Congress were the possible 
conflicts of interest generated when auditors provide non-audit 
services to issuers, and SOX prohibits auditors from providing 
certain non-audit services to their audit clients.40  Prohibited 
services include: (1) bookkeeping or other services related to the 
accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; (2) 
financial information systems design and implementation; (3) 
appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-
in-kind reports; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit 
outsourcing services; (6) management functions or human 
resources; (7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment 
banking services; (8) legal services and expert services unrelated to 
the audit; and (9) any other service that the Board determines, by 
regulation, is impermissible.41 
b.  Services Requiring Pre-Approval 
The services that are not prohibited outright must, in general, 
be pre-approved by the issuer’s audit committee before an outside 
auditor may perform them.42 The audit committee may delegate 
the power to pre-approve services to one or more members who are 
independent directors.43  If, however, the delegated power is 
exercised, the delegated pre-approvals must be presented to the 
full audit committee at the next scheduled meeting.44 
 
 40. Id. § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 771-72 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) 
(adding § 10A(g) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 41. Id. § 201(g). See Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2002) 
(restricting the services an auditor may provide to issuers). 
 42. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 202, 116 Stat. at 772 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78j-1) (adding § 10A(i)(1) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 43. Id. (adding § 10A(i)(3) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 44. Id. 
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The requirement of pre-approval applies to both audit and 
non-audit services.45  “Audit services” include comfort letters issued 
in connection with the issuer’s offering securities, and thus go 
beyond the typical understanding of services included in an audit.46  
Excluded from the pre-approval requirement (but still requiring 
approval) are certain de minimus non-audit services, if they (1) 
account for less than five percent of the fees paid to the auditor by 
the issuer in the year in which they were rendered, (2) were not 
recognized as non-audit services at the time the outside auditors 
were engaged, (3) are promptly brought to the audit committee’s 
attention, and (4) are approved before the completion of the 
audit.47 Finally, not only do all non-audit services need to be 
approved (most of them in advance), but their approval must be 
disclosed in the issuer’s periodic reports filed under 1934 Act 
section 13(a).48 
c.  Rotation of Audit Partners 
SOX contemplates that a registered accounting firm auditing 
an issuer will have one person responsible for supervising the audit 
and one person responsible for reviewing the supervisor’s work.49  
Neither of these persons may provide audit services to the issuer for 
more than five consecutive years.50  Rotation of audit firms is not 
required; however, the Comptroller General of the United States is 
directed by SOX to study the pros and cons of rotating audit firms 
and to report to Congress.51 
d.  Auditor Reports to Audit Committee 
Outside auditors must timely report to the issuer’s audit 
committee regarding: (1) all critical accounting policies and 
practices to be used; (2) alternative treatments of financial 
information (within GAAP) that have been discussed with 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (adding § 10A(i)(1)(A) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 47. Id. (adding § 10A(i)(1)(B) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).  See 
Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2002) (restricting the services 
an auditor may provide to issuers). 
 48. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 202, 116 Stat. at 772 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78j-1) (adding § 10A(i)(2) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 49. Id. § 203, 116 Stat. at 773 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l) (adding § 
10A(j) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. § 207(a)(b), 116 Stat. at 775 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7232). 
9
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management, the ramifications of such alternative treatments, and 
the auditor’s preferred treatment; and (3) all other material 
written communications between management and the auditors.52  
This has the effect of putting all material communications between 
management of the issuer and the outside auditors before the audit 
committee, which can thereby review the relationship between 
those two entities and ensure the independence of the auditors. 
e.  Issuer Employment of Auditor Staff 
Because an issuer’s outside accountants have in-depth 
knowledge of the issuer and the challenges it faces, it is not 
uncommon for personnel from an issuer’s accounting firm later to 
take employment with the issuer. To guard against conflicts of 
interest, however, SOX prohibits an accounting firm from auditing 
an issuer if the issuer’s CEO, CFO, controller, or chief accounting 
officer was employed by the accounting firm and participated in 
any capacity in the issuer’s audit within the preceding twelve 
months.53 
f.  Study of Principles-Based Accounting 
Accounting in the United States is largely “rule-based,” 
meaning it is governed by rules that define as precisely as possible 
the resolution of accounting issues.54  Unlike the United States, 
many countries have “principles-based” accounting, meaning that 
accounting is done under a set of principles that provide policy 
guidance for resolving individual issues.55  Each approach has its 
 
 52. Id. § 204, 116 Stat. at 773 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (adding § 
10A(k) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).  See Rule 2-07 of Regulation S-X, 
17 C.F.R. § 210.2-07 (2002). 
 53. Sarbanes Oxley Act § 206, 116 Stat. at 774-775 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j-1) (adding § 10A(l) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 54. The rules of U.S. accounting are codified as “generally accepted 
accounting principles” (GAAP).  United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 
805, 811 n.7 (1984) (describing GAAP as “the conventions, rules and procedures 
that define accepted accounting practices”).  The Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) promulgates GAAP standards.  See Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, available at http://www.fasb.org/ (last visited May 19, 2004) (“The mission 
of the Financial Accounting Standards Board is to establish and improve standards 
of financial accounting and reporting for the guidance and education of the 
public . . . .”). 
 55. See Fredrick Gill, Principles-Based Accounting Standards, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 967 (2003); Peter Jeffrey, International Harmonization of Accounting 
Standards, and the Question of Off-Balance Sheet Treatment, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
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strengths and weaknesses. After the financial scandals of 2001-02, 
however, some observers believed that the U.S. rule-based system 
encouraged issuers and accountants to stray too close to the edge, 
complying with the letter of the rule while avoiding its spirit.56  The 
rules might communicate precisely what not to do in order to avoid 
breaking the law, leaving it open for issuers and their auditors to 
accomplish the same result by other means.  Section 108(d) of 
SOX directs the S.E.C. to study the possibility of implementing a 
principles-based accounting system in the United States, and to 
report to Congress on the results.57  If the S.E.C. were to 
recommend changing to a principles-based system, and Congress 
and the Board were to concur, it likely would be the most dramatic 
reform of financial reporting in the history of the United States. 
B.  Regulation of Lawyers 
To this point we have addressed the extensive regulation of 
accountants imposed by SOX.  SOX also addresses the professional 
responsibility of lawyers, although in a less comprehensive manner.  
There is not, for example, a body similar to the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board to register attorneys practicing before 
the S.E.C., nor are the duties applicable to attorneys spelled out in 
as much detail as they are for accountants.  Nevertheless, section 
307 of SOX requires the S.E.C. to adopt rules “setting forth 
minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys . . . .”58  
As the following sections will reveal, the S.E.C.’s rules regarding 
attorneys are complex and require careful attention by 
practitioners. S.E.C. regulation of attorneys59 has been controversial 
in the past,60 and the controversy is likely to continue under SOX. 
 
341 (2002). 
 56. See S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 13 (2002); FASB, Proposal, Principles-Based 
Approach to U.S. Standard Setting (Oct. 21, 2002), available at http://www.fasb.org/ 
proposals/principles-based_approach.pdf (last visited May 19, 2004). 
 57. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 108(d), 116 Stat. at 768 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77s). 
 58. Id. § 307, 116 Stat. at 784 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245). 
 59. See S.E.C. Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2002).  The Rules of 
Practice set out standards for attorneys practicing before the S.E.C. and authorize 
the S.E.C. to suspend or disbar attorneys who violate those standards. Id. § 
201.102.  The most commonly addressed violations include: lack of qualifications, 
defect of personal character, unethical conduct, and the violation of securities 
laws. Id. § 201.102(e)(1). 
 60. See, e.g., In re George C. Kern, Jr. (Allied Stores Corp.), Admin. Proc. File 
No. 3-6869 (Nov. 14, 1988) [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH); 
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1.  “Up-the-ladder” Reporting  
SOX mandates “up-the-ladder” reporting of a material 
violation of securities law, breach of fiduciary duty, or similar 
violation by the issuer or any of its agents.  Up-the-ladder reporting 
means that the lawyer who becomes aware of material evidence of 
such a violation must report it (a) first, to the chief legal officer of 
the issuer, and if that person does not provide an appropriate 
response, then (b) further, to the audit committee or another 
board committee composed of only independent directors.61  Up-
the-ladder reporting is not triggered, however, until the lawyer has 
“evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of 
fiduciary duty or similar violation . . . .”62  The phrases “evidence of 
a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or 
similar violation” and “appropriate response” are critical, as they 
trigger the requirement to report up the ladder. 
a.  “Evidence of Material Violation” 
The S.E.C.’s new professional conduct rules63 define “evidence 
of a material violation” as “credible evidence, based upon which it 
would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent 
and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely 
that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to 
occur.”64 
b.  “Breach of Fiduciary Duty” 
Under the S.E.C.’s professional conduct rules, “breach of 
fiduciary duty refers to any breach of fiduciary or similar duty to 
the issuer recognized under an applicable federal or state statute or 
at common law, including but not limited to misfeasance, 
nonfeasance, abdication of duty, abuse of trust, and approval of 
unlawful transactions.”65 
 
In re Carter and Johnson, 47 S.E.C. 471 (1981). 
 61. Sarbanes Oxley Act § 307, 116 Stat. at 784 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
7245). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Standards for Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and 
Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. pt. 
205 (2003) (adopting standards required by Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307). 
 64. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e). 
 65. Id. § 205.2(d). 
12
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c.  “Appropriate Response” 
This term is important because if the reporting lawyer 
determines that the response she receives is not appropriate, she is 
required to go further up the ladder to the audit or other board 
committee.  For purposes of the professional conduct rules, 
“ ‘appropriate response’ means a response to an attorney regarding 
reported evidence of a material violation as a result of which the 
attorney reasonably believes: (1) That no material violation . . . has 
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur”; (2) that the issuer has 
taken appropriate measures to remedy or prevent material 
violations; or (3) “that the issuer has . . . retained or directed an 
attorney to review the reported evidence of a material violation” 
and either has substantially implemented any remedial 
recommendations made by the attorney or the attorney may assert 
a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer or agent in any 
proceeding relating to the reported evidence of a material 
violation.66 
2.  Attorney-Client Privilege and “Noisy Withdrawal” 
One of the more controversial aspects of the S.E.C.’s efforts to 
regulate lawyers has been its attempts to force lawyers to report 
wrongdoing by their clients to the government; this raises issues 
about attorney-client privilege when, for example, the attorney has 
learned of past wrongdoing in a privileged communication.67  SOX 
preserves attorney-client privilege because up-the-ladder reporting 
remains within the corporate client (e.g., to chief legal officer, audit 
committee, etc.), and the reporting attorney has not thereby 
violated the privilege.  If the lawyer were required to report to third 
parties, however, such a report might well violate the privilege and 
that could leave the lawyer open to professional discipline under 
state law. 
What happens if lawyers report up the ladder to no avail?  As 
originally proposed, the rules implementing SOX section 307 
required such lawyers to withdraw from representation of the 
client, to notify the S.E.C. that they had done so for ethical reasons, 
 
 66. Id. § 205.2(b). 
 67. The American Bar Association’s Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 forbids an 
attorney’s disclosure of a client’s past acts if that information was gained through a 
privileged attorney-client communication.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.6 (2002). 
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and to disaffirm any questionable S.E.C. filings the issuer has 
made.68  Such a withdrawal is called “noisy” because of the 
requirement that the withdrawing lawyer notify the S.E.C. and 
disaffirm filings.  Because they require some reporting to third 
parties (namely, the S.E.C.), the noisy withdrawal rules might 
require lawyers to violate the attorney-client privilege and, 
unsurprisingly, the rules drew a firestorm of criticism from the 
bar.69  After the reaction of the bar became known, a revised “noisy 
withdrawal” rule was proposed.70  The S.E.C. has not taken action 
on the new proposals yet, but securities lawyers eventually may 
become subject to a noisy withdrawal requirement in some form.71 
3.  Statutory Basis for Attorney Discipline 
Rule 102(e) of the S.E.C.’s Rules of Practice72 gives the S.E.C. 
authority to discipline attorneys practicing before it.73  Before SOX 
was passed, the S.E.C. did not have an express statutory basis for 
this rule, but rather relied on its general rulemaking powers and its 
inherent authority under the securities laws.74  Section 602 of SOX, 
however, essentially codifies rule 102(e) and thereby provides an 
explicit statutory basis for the Commission’s power to discipline 
attorneys.75 
a.  Appearing and Practicing Before the S.E.C. 
The S.E.C. has disciplinary powers over lawyers “appearing and 
 
 68. Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8150 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002), 67 Fed. 
Reg. 71, 670, 71, 673 (Dec. 2, 2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150.htm (last visited May 19, 2004). 
 69. See Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8185 (Jan. 29, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 
(Feb. 6, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm (last 
visited May 19, 2004). 
 70. Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8186 (Jan. 29, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 6324 
(Feb. 6, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8186.htm (last 
visited May 19, 2004). 
 71. Id. 
 72. 17 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2002) (predating Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 73. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2004). 
 74. Judicial review of the S.E.C.’s rulemaking authority has been favorable to 
the S.E.C. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. S.E.C., 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 75. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 602, 116 Stat. 747, 794 
(2002) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3) (amended by adding § 4C(a) to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
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practicing before [it] in any way.”76  The S.E.C.’s rules define 
“appearing and practicing” as follows: 
(i) Transacting any business with the Commission, 
including communications in any form; (ii) Representing 
an issuer in a Commission administrative proceeding or in 
connection with any Commission investigation, inquiry, 
information request, or subpoena; (iii) Providing advice 
in respect of the United States securities laws or the 
[S.E.C.’s] rules or regulations thereunder regarding any 
document that the attorney has notice will be filed with or 
submitted to, or incorporated into any document that will 
be filed with or submitted to the [S.E.C.], including the 
provision of such advice in the context of preparing, or 
participating in the preparation of, any such document; 
or (iv) Advising an issuer as to whether information or a 
statement, opinion, or other writing is required . . . to be 
filed with or submitted to, or incorporated into any 
document that will be filed with or submitted to, the 
[S.E.C.].77 
In addition, a lawyer retained or (if in-house) directed to 
investigate evidence of a material violation, which has been 
reported under the up-the-ladder procedures, is deemed to be 
“appearing and practicing” before the S.E.C.78 
“Appearing and practicing” does not include a lawyer who: “(i) 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and 
Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 
205.2(a) (adding the standards required by Sarbanes-Oxley section 307). The 
S.E.C.’s Standards for Professional Conduct define “appearing and practicing” 
before the S.E.C. more narrowly than do the Rules of Practice. Under the latter, 
“practicing before the Commission” includes for example, the preparation, or 
participation in the preparation, of any paper, by any attorney, filed with the 
S.E.C. in any document. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(f). The Standards, however, define 
“appearing and practicing” before the S.E.C. as communicating with the S.E.C. “in 
any form”; representing an issuer in connection with an S.E.C. administrative 
proceeding or investigation (including informally such as S.E.C. requests for 
information and inquiries, as well as subpoenas); providing advice in respect of 
the United States securities laws or S.E.C. rules regarding any document filed with 
the S.E.C., “including the provision of such advice in the context of preparing, or 
participating in the preparation of, any such document”; and providing advice on the 
need to file any document with the S.E.C. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a) (emphasis added). 
The italicized language requires that securities law advice be rendered, and thus 
appears to be a retreat from the position of the Rules of Practice, which make the 
preparation of a filed document “practicing before the Commission” regardless 
whether securities law advice is provided. 
 78. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(5) (2004). 
15
Schaumann: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Bird's-eye View
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
SCHAUMANN-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  8:21 PM 
1330 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:4 
Conducts the activities [described above] other than in the context 
of providing legal services to an issuer with whom the attorney has 
an attorney-client relationship; or (ii) Is a non-appearing foreign 
attorney.”79 
4.  Sanctions for Violation of the Attorney Conduct Rules 
Rules for attorney conduct lack influence if they are not 
enforceable. SOX section 602 therefore provides that the S.E.C. 
may censure a violating lawyer or deny the violator the privilege of 
appearing and practicing before it.80  The S.E.C.’s implementing 
rules81 echo this authority, and, in addition, expressly authorize the 
S.E.C. to “subject such attorney to the civil penalties and remedies 
for a violation of the federal securities laws available to the 
Commission in an action brought by the Commission 
thereunder.”82  The latter phrase potentially could bring into play 
the full spectrum of remedies available to the S.E.C. in civil or 
administrative proceedings.83 
5.  Role of the “Qualified Legal Compliance Committee” 
No discussion of the new standards for professional conduct 
governing securities lawyers would be complete without mention of 
the “qualified legal compliance committee” (“QLCC”).  An issuer 
may form a QLCC to take responsibility for legal compliance 
issues.84  The QLCC must include at least one member of the 
issuer’s audit committee and two or more independent members of 
the issuer’s board of directors (that is, directors who are not 
 
 79. Id. § 205.2(a)(2).  See also § 205.2(j)(1-3)(defining a “foreign attorney” as 
a lawyer who is licensed outside the United States, who does not advise on U.S. 
securities laws except in conjunction with a U.S. attorney, and who only 
incidentally does things that would otherwise be “appearing and practicing” 
before the S.E.C.). 
 80. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 602, 116 Stat. 745, 794 
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3) (adding § 4C to the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934). 
 81. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(b). 
 82. Id. § 205.6(a). 
 83. A full discussion of these is beyond the scope of this article. Briefly, 
however, these include injunctions, orders for disgorgement, civil penalties, forced 
resignations, and disbarment or suspension. See Securities Act of 1933 § 20(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 
78u(d)(2) (2000); S.E.C. Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e). 
 84. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k). 
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/4
SCHAUMANN-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  8:21 PM 
2004] SARBANES-OXLEY: A BIRD’S-EYE VIEW 1331 
employed, directly or indirectly, by the issuer).85  The QLCC need 
not contain any lawyers.  Perhaps that is not surprising since up-the-
ladder reporting will in most cases terminate with the issuer’s audit 
committee, which likewise need not contain any lawyers.86 
A QLCC comes into play in two situations: (1) when the 
reporting lawyer elects to report directly to the QLCC rather than 
to the chief legal officer; or (2) the reporting lawyer reports the 
matter to the chief legal officer, who instead of taking action 
personally, refers the matter to the QLCC.  The QLCC must 
establish written procedures for accepting, maintaining and 
considering such reports in a confidential manner.87 
A QLCC must have at least the following authority: 
(i) To inform the issuer’s chief legal officer and chief 
executive officer . . . of any report of evidence of a 
material violation . . . ; (ii) To determine whether an 
investigation is necessary regarding any report of evidence 
of a material violation . . . and, if it determines an 
investigation is necessary or appropriate, to: (A) Notify 
the audit committee or the full board of directors; (B) 
Initiate an investigation, which may be conducted either 
by the chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) or by 
outside attorneys; and (C) Retain such additional expert 
personnel as the committee deems necessary; and (iii) At 
the conclusion of any such investigation, to: (A) 
Recommend, by majority vote, that the issuer implement 
an appropriate response to evidence of a material 
violation; and (B) Inform the chief legal officer and the 
chief executive officer (or the equivalents thereof) and 
the board of directors of the results of any such 
investigation under this section and the appropriate 
remedial measures to be adopted  . . . .88 
Additionally, the QLCC must have authority to take all other 
appropriate action, including notifying the Commission in the 
event that the issuer fails in any material respect to implement the 
QLCC’s recommendations.89 
Most issuers will probably establish a QLCC because such a 
committee is more likely to prepare a coordinated response to 
 
 85. Id. § 205.2(k)(1). 
 86. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 87. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)(2). 
 88. Id. § 205.2(k)(3). 
 89. Id. § 205.2(k)(4). 
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evidence of securities law problems than the chief legal officer, who 
may not have procedures developed in advance to deal with such 
issues.  In addition, a QLCC involves the issuer’s board at an early 
stage of the response, perhaps making an adequate response more 
likely. 
C.  Regulation of Securities Analysts 
In June of 2001, New York state investigators announced an 
investigation of securities analysts at several major securities firms.90  
The analysts were allegedly compensated in part by fees generated 
by investment banking deals with the issuers. The more successful 
an issuer was in the markets, the more investment banking business 
the issuer would bring to the securities firm and the higher the fees 
paid by the issuer (and thus, the greater the analyst’s 
compensation).91  Analysts thus were caught in a conflict of interest 
because favorable recommendations of an issuer’s securities would 
generate business for the analyst’s employer, that, in turn, would 
generate substantial bonuses and salary increases for the analyst.  
Analysts, therefore, were transformed from impartial researchers of 
a company’s prospects to promoters of the company’s stock.  After 
the market bubble burst, analysts continued to issue optimistic 
forecasts for securities whose prices were plunging, prompting an 
investigation by the attorney general of New York that the federal 
regulators ultimately joined.92  Among other things, the 
investigators made public certain e-mails among analysts and other 
brokerage employees in which the analysts spoke derisively of 
securities they were simultaneously recommending to public 
investors.93  The ensuing scandal severely eroded investor 
confidence in the markets and ultimately led to a settlement 
between regulators and the securities firms totaling approximately 
$1 billion.94 
 
 90. Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, Affidavit in 
Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section 
354, at 2, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf 
(last visited May 19, 2004); Scott Thurm, When Do Analysts Cover Their Own 
Interests?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2001, at C1. 
 91. Spitzer, supra note 90, at 3-5. 
 92. Id.; Charles Gasparino, SEC Launches Inquiry into Wall Street Research, WALL 
ST. J., May 1, 2002, at C3. 
 93. Spitzer, supra note 90, at 11-12. 
 94. Randall Smith & Aaron L, Lucchetti, How Spitzer Pact will Affect Wall Street, 
WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at C1. 
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Against this background it should come as no surprise that 
SOX regulates securities analysts, and that SOX regulation of 
analysts is focused on conflicts of interest.  Section 501 of SOX 
requires either the S.E.C. or the SROs to adopt rules regulating 
securities analysts and research reports.95  In the spring of 2003, the 
S.E.C. adopted Regulation AC (“Analyst Certification”), pursuant 
to SOX and the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.96  
Regulation AC is likely just the first step in regulation of analysts, 
and it treads somewhat cautiously.  It requires that analysts’ written 
research reports must include certifications of two kinds.  First, 
analysts must certify that all of the views expressed in the research 
report accurately reflect the analyst’s personal views about the 
subject security or issuer.97  In addition, a written report must 
include either a statement attesting that the analyst’s compensation 
is not related to the specific recommendations or views expressed 
in the research report, or, if that is not the case, accurate disclosure 
of the source, amount, and purpose of such compensation, and 
that the compensation could influence the recommendations or 
views expressed in the research report.98 
In addition to providing written research, analysts also often 
appear publicly to discuss their views of particular securities and 
issuers.  In some respects, public appearances may be even more 
dangerous than written reports; it is possible that investors would 
respond even more rapidly to a public appearance, for example on 
television, than to a written report.  Accordingly, Regulation AC 
prohibits any analyst compensation based on the views the analyst 
expresses in a public appearance.99  Under Regulation AC, analysts 
must certify each calendar quarter that the views expressed by the 
analyst in all public appearances during the quarter accurately 
reflected the analyst’s personal views at that time about any and all 
of the subject securities or issuers.100  Further, analysts must certify 
that no part of their compensation was, is, or will be directly or 
indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views 
 
 95. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501(a), 116 Stat. 745, 
791 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6) (adding § 15D to the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934). 
 96. Final Rule: Regulation Analyst Certification, Exchange Act Release No. 
33-8193 (Feb. 20, 2003), 17 C.F.R. § 242.500-242.505 (2003). 
 97. Id. § 501(a)(1), 17 C.F.R § 242.501. 
 98. Id. § 501(a)(2). 
 99. Id. § 502, 17 C.F.R § 242.502. 
 100. Id. 
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expressed by the research analyst in any public appearances.101 
Regulation AC, however, does not completely discharge the 
burden of analyst regulation under SOX, which requires the S.E.C. 
to regulate in more areas than just conflict of interest.  Briefly, SOX 
requires the Commission to promulgate rules: (1) restricting 
prepublication clearance or approval of research reports by 
investment bankers or others not directly responsible for 
investment research (other than legal or compliance staff), (2) 
prohibiting supervision and evaluation of analysts by investment 
bankers, (3) prohibiting retaliation against analysts for negative or 
unfavorable reports that may adversely affect the securities firms’ 
investment banking relationships, (4) defining periods of time 
during which securities firms involved in a public offering are 
prohibited from publishing research reports related to the offered 
securities, (5) requiring disclosure by analysts of any investments 
they have in the issuer that is the subject of their report, (6) 
establishing institutional protections for analysts against pressure 
from investment bankers, and (7) requiring disclosure whether an 
issuer whose securities are recommended in a report is or in the 
past year has been a customer of the securities firm.  In addition, 
the S.E.C. and SROs may address other issues they deem 
appropriate.102 
So far we have considered the SOX provisions regulating 
certain persons involved professionally in the securities business, 
from accountants to lawyers and investment analysts.  Missing from 
the discussion to this point have been the issuers themselves.  They, 
too, are regulated by SOX, and it is to them we now turn. 
 
III. ENHANCED CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
A.  Officer Certifications 
The corporations involved in the scandals that prompted the 
passage of SOX had, without exception, manipulated their 
disclosures to investors in various ways.  While SOX regulation of 
securities professionals is an attempt to reduce such manipulation 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501, 116 Stat. 745, 791 
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6) (adding § 15D to the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934). 
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indirectly by making the necessary professional help significantly 
more difficult to obtain, SOX also aims directly to enhance 
disclosure by public companies via several means. 
First, the issuer’s management is now required to certify the 
issuer’s financial information as accurate and complete.  SOX 
contains both civil103 and criminal104 provisions requiring 
certification of financial data.  Each requires both the CEO and the 
CFO (or their equivalents) to certify as accurate the financial 
information in the company’s reports filed under the 1934 Act.105  
By June 2003, the Justice Department had already filed charges 
against a corporate officer under section 906.106 
Issuer reports under the 1934 Act also must contain officer 
certifications that the issuer has in place adequate “disclosure 
controls and procedures.”107  Disclosure controls and procedures 
are the processes the issuer uses to ensure that management knows 
of all information, financial and non-financial, necessary for the 
issuer to meet its reporting and disclosure obligations accurately 
and timely.108 
In addition to these “disclosure controls and procedures” 
certifications, each annual report under the 1934 Act (i.e., Forms 
10-K or 10-KSB) must include management’s report on internal 
accounting controls, and the report of the issuer’s outside auditors 
on management’s report.109  Internal accounting controls are 
different from disclosure controls and procedures, which are 
discussed above.  Internal controls are the processes the issuer has 
in place to ensure that the financial reports prepared by its 
accountants are accurate and complete; they are a control used to 
ensure that the financial information the issuer generates actually 
reflects its own financial condition.  While some internal 
accounting controls are also disclosure controls, there are instances 
where there is no overlap.  For example, an issuer might require 
 
 103. Id. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241). 
 104. Id. § 906(a), 116 Stat. at 806 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350). 
 105. Id. §§ 302(a), 906(a). 
 106. See United States v. Smith, No. CR03-PT-126-S (N.D. Ala., plea entered 
Mar. 19, 2003). 
 107. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 116 Stat. at 789 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
7262). 
 108. Id.; Final Rule: Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial 
Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 
Exchange Act Release No. 33-8238 (June 5, 2003), 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 
240, 249, 270 and 274 (2003). 
 109. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404(b). 
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two signatures on checks over a certain amount.  That would be an 
internal accounting control, but might not be a disclosure 
control.110 
B.  Section 16 Reports 
Section 16 of the 1934 Act111 requires certain “insiders” of the 
issuer to file reports disclosing their ownership of the issuer’s 
securities and any changes in that ownership.  The insiders 
required to report include the issuer’s directors, officers, and 
holders of more than ten percent of any class of the issuer’s equity 
securities.  There is a vast amount of scholarship addressing section 
16; the purpose of this section is not to summarize section 16 but 
rather to highlight the changes made by SOX. 
First, SOX amended the 1934 Act section 16(a) to require 
section 16 insiders to file statements reflecting changes in their 
ownership of the issuer’s securities within two business days of the 
change.112  In addition, the S.E.C. has adopted rules requiring the 
electronic filing of section 16(a) reports and, if the issuer maintains 
a corporate web site, posting of the reports on the web site.113 
C.  Off-Balance-Sheet Transactions 
Each annual and quarterly report filed with the S.E.C. must 
disclose “all material off-balance sheet transactions” and all 
“relationships of the issuer with . . . persons, that may have a 
material . . . effect on” the issuer’s financial condition.114  This 
requirement is another response to the Enron bankruptcy, which 
was precipitated in part by Enron’s immense exposure in off-
balance-sheet transactions115 with entities controlled by its own 
 
 110. See Final Rule: Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial 
Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, supra 
note 108. 
 111. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2000). 
 112. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 403(a), 116 Stat. at 788 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78p) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding § 16(a)(2)(c)). 
 113. Id. Final Rule: Mandated Electronic Filing and Website Posting for Forms 
3, 4 and 5, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8230 (May 7, 2003), 17 C.F.R pts. 230, 
232, 239, 240, 249, 250, 259, 260, 269 and 274 (2003) (adopting amendments to 
Regulation S-T, Rule 16a-3, Forms 3, 4 and 5). 
 114. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 401(a), 116 Stat. 785 (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78m) (amending § 13(j) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 115. Off-balance sheet transactions are transactions that, under generally 
accepted accounting principles, need not be disclosed to investors in the issuer’s 
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insiders.116  SOX also instructed the S.E.C. to study the use of off-
balance sheet techniques and to report the results to Congress 
along with its recommendations for additional or different 
regulation.117 
D.  Pro Forma Financial Information 
Issuers often present “pro forma” financial information in 
various documents provided to investors.  Such information is 
designed to present results “as if” certain things were true or “as if” 
certain things had (or had not) taken place.  Because pro forma 
information is not presented in accordance with GAAP, it could 
mislead investors who are unable to decipher for themselves what 
such information would look like if it reflected actual operating 
results and were reported under GAAP.  SOX therefore requires 
that pro forma information be (a) presented so as not to mislead 
investors, and (b) reconciled with the issuer’s reports prepared 
under GAAP.118 
 
financial statements, and therefore do not appear on the balance sheet. As an 
example, the financial results of a company that is not a subsidiary, but merely an 
investment of the issuer, need not be consolidated with the issuer’s results on the 
issuer’s financial statements. 
 116. See supra note 115. See also Final Rule: Disclosures in Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate 
Contractual Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8182 (Jan. 28, 2003), 17 
C.F.R. pts. 228, 229 and 249 (2003).  For example, suppose E Corp. wants to 
engage in certain risky transactions without disclosing the risks. E Corp. decides to 
purchase a minority interest in a partnership, the majority of which is owned by E 
Corp.’s CFO. Because E Corp. owns only a minority interest, it is not required to 
consolidate the partnership’s financial results with its own. With such “off-balance-
sheet” transactions, E Corp. can report as income whatever profit it receives from 
its investment. Before SOX, the risks of the investment did not have to be 
disclosed to E Corp.’s shareholders or the market because the risks “belong to” the 
partnership rather than to E Corp., and the partnership’s financial results are 
unconsolidated with E Corp.’s. In many cases this is acceptable, as the partnership 
is merely an investment. But suppose the partnership were capitalized with E 
Corp. stock, and further that if the partnership loses money, E Corp. will be 
required to issue more stock. In this case E Corp. actually is bearing most of the 
economic risk of the partnership. (Aficionados of corporation law will also 
immediately recognize the self-dealing in transactions where the issuer provides 
nearly all the capital to a partnership in which the issuer’s CFO is the majority 
partner.) Under SOX, the risks of enterprises borne by the issuer must be 
disclosed. 
 117. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401(c). 
 118. Id. § 401(b). 
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E.  Earnings Releases and Similar Announcements 
The S.E.C. also has amended Form 8-K to require that 
earnings releases and similar announcements made to the public 
be furnished to the S.E.C.119 The trigger for this requirement is the 
disclosure of material information regarding a completed fiscal 
year or quarter.120  The press release or other announcement is to 
be appended as an exhibit to a current report on Form 8-K; 
however, the exhibit will not be considered “filed” with the S.E.C. 
and the criminal penalties that might otherwise apply to false 
filings will therefore not be triggered.121  Similarly, the exhibit 
would not be automatically incorporated by reference in another 
document filed with the S.E.C.122 
F.  Code of Ethics for Financial Officers  
Under SOX, issuers must disclose whether or not they have a 
code of ethics that applies to their respective senior financial 
officers and, if not, why not.123  Any change in such a code must be 
“immediately” disclosed on Form 8-K.124  In this context, “code of 
ethics” means standards that are reasonably necessary to promote 
(a) honest and ethical conduct; (b) accurate, timely, and 
understandable disclosure in the issuer’s periodic reports; and (c) 
compliance with law and regulations.125  Although SOX does not 
require issuers to have such a code, its requirement to disclose the 
absence of such a code and to state reasons why no code is in place, 
seems clearly intended to apply pressure toward having a code. 
G.  Financial Expert on Audit Committee 
SOX requires issuers to disclose whether or not they have on 
 
 119. Final Rule: Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 
Exchange Act Release No. 33-8176 (Jan. 22, 2003), 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 244 and 
249 (2003) (adopting Regulation G and changes to Form 8-K). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406(a), 116 Stat. at 789 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7264). 
 124. Id. § 406(b). 
 125. Id. § 406(c); Final Rule: Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8177 (Jan. 23, 
2003),17 C.F.R. pts 228, 229 and 249 (2003); Disclosure Required by Sections 406 
and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; Correction, Exchange Act Release No. 
33-8177A (Mar. 26, 2003), 17 C.F.R. pts. 228 and 249 (2003). 
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their audit committees at least one member who qualifies as a 
“financial expert.”126  If no member of the audit committee is a 
financial expert, the issuer must disclose why.127  Although the 
financial expert provisions are framed in terms of disclosure, the 
goal, as with the code of ethics, appears to aim at pressuring issuers 
to include at least one financial expert on the audit committee. 
H.  Real-Time Issuer Disclosures 
All issuers required to report under 1934 Act §§ 13(a) or 15(d) 
must disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis additional 
information, to be specified by the S.E.C., concerning material 
changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer.128  
These disclosures must be in plain English.129 
I.  Enhanced S.E.C. Review of Periodic Reports 
SOX also requires the S.E.C. to step up the number of reviews 
it conducts of issuers’ periodic reports under the 1934 Act.130  In 
addition to suggesting a number of criteria the S.E.C. may use to 
determine when review is indicated,131 SOX also requires that all 
issuers that report under 1934 Act §§ 13(a) or 15(d) be reviewed at 
least every three years.132 
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS 
Although corporate governance issues are generally 
considered to be a matter of state corporation law, Congress clearly 
believed that flawed governance was partly to blame for some of the 
financial scandals of 2001-02.  SOX therefore includes a number of 
provisions that modify the way corporations are governed, with a 
special emphasis on strengthening the role of the audit committee.  
In addition, most loans made by issuers to their directors or 
executive officers are prohibited, and the latter are prohibited 
 
 126. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407(a), 116 Stat. at 790 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7265). 
 127. Id.; Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, supra note 125. 
 128. Id. § 409, 116 Stat. at 791 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m) (amending § 
13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. § 408(a), 116 Stat. at 790 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7266). 
 131. Id. § 408(b), 116 Stat. at 790-91. 
 132. Id. § 408(c), 116 Stat. at 791. 
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from attempting improperly to influence the conduct of audits of 
the issuer. 
 
A.  Audit Committee Reforms 
Many of the Act’s substantive governance reforms are directed 
at strengthening and enhancing the role of the audit committee as 
a sort of corporate “watchdog.”  First, no security of an issuer can 
be listed on a national securities exchange unless the issuer is in 
compliance with the audit committee requirements.133  If the issuer 
has no audit committee, its entire board will be deemed to 
constitute the audit committee (and will be subject to the audit 
committee standards).134 
1.  Audit Committee Responsibilities 
An audit committee is directly responsible for the 
appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of the 
issuer’s registered public accounting firm regarding its audit 
reports and related matters.135  The committee is also responsible 
for resolving any disputes between the outside accountants and 
management over financial reporting,136 and the outside 
accountants must report directly to the audit committee.137  All 
audit and non-audit services performed by the issuer’s outside 
accountants must be pre-approved by the audit committee.138  The 
latter is a significant change from previous practice, when the 
relationship with the outside accountants was controlled by the 
issuer’s management. 
 
 133. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 775 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C § 
78j-1) (adding § 10A(m)(1)(A) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Standards 
Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8220 
(Apr. 9, 2003), 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249 and 247 (2003) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm (last visited May 19, 2004). 
 134. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 205(a), 116 Stat. at 773-74 (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C § 78c) (adding § 3(a)(58) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 135. Id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (adding § 
10A(m)(2) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 136. Id. (adding § 10A(m)(4)(A) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 137. Id.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(2)(2003). 
 138. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 202, 116 Stat. at 772 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78j-1) (adding § 10A(i)(1)(A) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).  See supra 
notes 42-48 and accompanying text (regarding pre-approval, in “regulation of 
accountants”). 
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Audit committees must establish procedures for receiving, 
handling, and dealing with complaints regarding accounting, 
internal controls, or auditing matters.139  In addition, the audit 
committee must establish procedures permitting the confidential, 
anonymous submission of concerns by the employees of the issuer 
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.140  The 
audit committee must have authority to hire independent counsel 
and other advisers as it deems necessary to help it do its job.141  
Issuers must provide funding for the audit committee’s payment of 
compensation to outside accountants and to any advisers hired by 
the audit committee.142 
2.  Audit Committee Membership 
As noted above,143 issuers must disclose whether or not they 
have on their audit committees at least one member who qualifies 
as a “financial expert.”  The goal of this “disclosure” requirement 
appears to be to pressure issuers to include at least one financial 
expert on the audit committee. Congress used a similar strategy in 
other sections of SOX.144  It is difficult to challenge the wisdom of 
having at least one expert in this role.  For this purpose, “experts” 
are persons having a deep understanding of financial accounting, 
acquired through experience as (or by supervising) high-level 
financial officers or public accountants.  Other relevant experience 
may also be considered in deciding whether someone is a financial 
expert.145  However, being named as a financial expert on the audit 
 
 139. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78j-1) (adding § 10A(m)(4)(A) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 140. Id. (adding § 10A(m)(4)(B) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(3)(2003). 
 141. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78j-1) (adding § 10A(m)(5) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10A-3(b)(4). 
 142. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776-77 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§78j-1) (adding § 10A(m)(6) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10A-3(b)(5). 
 143. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text. 
 145. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8177 (Mar. 3, 2003) 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229 and 
249 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm (last visited 
May 19, 2004); Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, Correction,  Exchange Act Release No. 33-8177A (Mar. 31, 2003), 17 
C.F.R. pts. 228, 229 and 249 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
final/33-8177a.htm (last visited May 19, 2004). 
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committee does not automatically make the named person an 
expert for other purposes, e.g., for purposes of the “due diligence” 
defense under Securities Act section 11.146 
Each audit committee member must be a member of the 
issuer’s board of directors.147  In addition, each audit committee 
member must be independent, meaning that (a) no member may 
receive fees from the issuer, other than fees for service on the audit 
committee, the board, or other board committees; and (b) no 
audit committee member may be an “affiliate” of the issuer.148  
There are some situations, however, in which requiring complete 
audit committee independence would be burdensome, and the 
S.E.C.’s rules provide that an issuer “going public” (that is, not 
previously required to file 1934 Act reports) need only to have one 
independent member of the audit committee for ninety days after 
the effectiveness of the IPO registration statement.  After ninety 
days, but before the first anniversary of effectiveness, only a 
majority of the audit committee must be independent.149 
Similarly, it often happens that the board of directors of two 
affiliated companies—for example, a parent and a subsidiary—are 
identical or have some members in common.  As long as a director 
serving on the boards of two or more affiliated companies meets 
the other requirements for independence from each company, she 
 
 146. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8177 (Mar. 3, 2003) 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229 and 
249 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm (last visited 
May 19, 2004); Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, Correction,  Exchange Act Release No. 33-8177A (Mar. 31, 2003), 17 
C.F.R. pts. 228, 229 and 249 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ 
33-8177a.htm (last visited May 19, 2004). 
 147. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§78j-1) (adding § 10A(m)(3) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10A-3(b)(1)(i)(2003). 
 148. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§78j-1) (adding § 10A(m)(3)(B)); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(1). “Affiliate” is 
defined as a person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the 
issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(c)(1)(i). “Control” is defined the same way that it is 
in SA rule 405 (i.e., the power to direct or cause the direction of the management 
and policies of the issuer). See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 405. The following persons are 
deemed to be affiliates of the issuer: executive officers of an affiliate of the issuer, 
directors who also are employees of an affiliate of the issuer, general partners of 
an affiliate of the issuer, and managing members of an affiliate of the issuer. 
Persons who are neither executive officers nor own more than ten percent of any 
class of voting equity securities of the issuer are deemed not to be “affiliates” (and 
thus are allowed to serve on the issuer’s audit committee).  17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-
3(e)(1)(ii)(A). 
 149. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(iv)(A). 
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will not be considered an affiliate solely because she serves on the 
board of an affiliated company.150 
In any case, the S.E.C.’s exclusion of “affiliates” from the audit 
committee is only the starting point for defining the independence 
of audit committee members.  Stock exchanges and markets, in 
particular, are well-positioned to raise the bar for independence 
even higher by adding additional requirements to their standards 
for listing issuers’ securities.  Both the NYSE and NASDAQ have 
proposed standards, discussed below, tougher than those mandated 
by the S.E.C. to ensure audit committee independence. 
a.  NYSE Proposed Standard for Independence 
The New York Stock Exchange proposal goes well beyond what 
SOX requires, in that an independent director for NYSE purposes 
has no direct or indirect material relationship with the issuer.  
Former employees of the issuer or the outside accountants (and a 
few additional categories of persons) would not be considered 
independent until five years had passed from the date of their most 
recent employment with either the issuer or the accountants.151 
b.  NASDAQ Proposed Standard for Independence 
The NASDAQ market has also proposed a definition of 
independence that, as applied to audit committee members, would 
exclude anyone receiving payments other than director’s fees, and 
anyone who is the executive officer of a charity that received 
substantial contributions from the issuer.152  Similar to the NYSE 
standard, former employees of the issuer or its accountants, and 
some others, would not be considered independent until three 
years have passed since their disqualifying employment.153 
 
 150. Id. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(iv)(B). 
 151. Self Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change 
and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. relating to 
Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47672 (Apr. 11, 2003), 68 
Fed. Reg. 19051 (Apr. 17, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-
47672.htm (last visited May 19, 2004). 
 152. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change 
and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the National Association of Securities Dealers, 
Inc. Relating to Proposed Amendments to NASD Rules 4200 and 4350 Regarding 
Board Independence and Independent Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-47516 (Mar. 17, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 14,451 (Mar. 25, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-47516.htm (last visited May 19, 2004). 
 153. Id. 
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B.  Prohibition Against Personal Loans 
SOX prohibits personal loans from an issuer (or its affiliates) 
to a director or executive officer of the issuer.154  Because issuers 
have historically advanced funds to directors and officers in a wide 
variety of situations, the exact reach of the prohibition is still 
unclear.  Loans by certain issuers are exempted from the 
prohibition; issuers that have a consumer credit business may make 
personal loans to directors and executive officers if the loans are on 
the same terms and of a type generally made available to the 
public.155  Of course, loans of a type and on the terms available to 
the public are not generally as attractive to the issuer’s directors 
and officers as the previously available, favorable loans. 
Advances of litigation expenses incurred by officers or 
directors as the result of their service to the issuer may or may not 
be “personal loans.”  Officers and directors are often entitled to 
such advances as a matter of contract right, either by a provision in 
their employment agreements or by a corporate bylaw.  Perhaps 
the answer will depend upon whether the officer or director wins 
or loses the lawsuit.  A win might make the litigation advance a 
contractual right; a loss, on the other hand, often involves the 
individual repaying the advances to the issuer and thus might be 
considered a “personal loan.” 
Issuers often fund short-term loans to directors and officers for 
the exercise of stock options.  These loans are usually repaid within 
days, when the underlying stock is sold.  The exercise price is 
refunded to the issuer, and the officer or directors keeps the 
difference between the exercise price and the market price.  Such 
plans are called “cashless option exercise.”  Similarly, many issuers 
obtain and pay for life insurance on officers and directors.  When 
the insured individuals can borrow against the value of the policy, 
this is called “split-dollar” insurance.  Such arrangements can be 
characterized as loans from the issuer, since the value against which 
the loan is made has been funded by the issuer.  The status of plans 
like split-dollar insurance and cashless option exercise under SOX 
is currently unknown. 
 
 154. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402(a), 116 Stat. at 787 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.  
§ 78(m)) (adding § 13(k)(1) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 155. Id. (adding § 13(k)(2) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
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C.  Prohibition Against Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits 
SOX section 303 states that it is illegal for an officer or director 
of an issuer to try to influence an audit in a way that violates S.E.C. 
rules,156 and under section 303, the S.E.C. has adopted new 1934 
Act rule 13b2-2(b).157  Subdivision (1) of this rule prohibits officers 
and directors (and their respective agents) from coercing, 
manipulating, misleading, or fraudulently influencing the issuer’s 
auditors when the officer, director or other person knew or should 
have known that the action, if successful, could result in rendering 
the issuer’s financial statements materially misleading.158  For 
example, it would be an attempt to improperly influence an audit if 
an officer or director were to try to persuade auditors to issue or 
reissue a report on an issuer’s financial statements that is not 
warranted in the circumstances (due to material violations of 
generally accepted accounting principles, generally accepted 
auditing standards, or other professional or regulatory standards), 
or not to perform audit, review, or other procedures required by 
generally accepted auditing standards or other professional 
standards, or not to withdraw an issued report, or not to 
communicate matters to an issuer’s audit committee.159 
If an issuer has to restate its financial reports due to 
misconduct, its CEO and CFO must reimburse the issuer for any 
bonus or compensation based on equity (e.g., stock options, 
“phantom” stock, etc.) received during the twelve months after the 
defective, later-restated report was filed, plus profits from the sale 
of securities during the same twelve-month period.160 
D.  No Insider Trades During Pension Fund Blackouts 
“Pension fund blackouts” are periods when pension fund 
participants may not engage in trades of the securities held in their 
accounts.  In the Enron case, many employees were furious to learn 
that during a pension fund blackout—and while Enron’s stock 
price was plummeting—senior executives were cutting their losses 
 
 156. Id. § 303(a), 116 Stat. at 778 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7242). 
 157. Final Rule: Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34,47890 (May 20, 2003), 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2003). 
 158. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(b)(1). 
 159. Id. § 240.13b2-2(b)(2). 
 160. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304, 116 Stat. at 778 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
7243). 
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by selling large quantities of Enron stock.  The employees, of 
course, were prohibited from selling during the blackout. SOX 
responds to this by prohibiting the directors and executive officers 
of an issuer from selling the issuer’s equity securities if a pension 
fund blackout is in effect.161  This prohibition applies to all equity 
securities acquired in connection with service or employment as a 
director or executive officer.162  Insider transactions are prohibited 
when a pension fund blackout (a) lasts for more than three 
business days and (b) suspends the ability of at least fifty percent of 
the plan participants to engage in plan transactions involving the 
issuer’s equity securities.163  Issuers must notify plan participants,164 
their directors and executive officers, and the S.E.C. of any 
blackout.165 
V. ENHANCED ENFORCEMENT 
In addition to the many changes and additions to the law 
made by SOX and already described, SOX creates new crimes, 
stiffens penalties for existing crimes, enhances the S.E.C.’s 
enforcement authority, extends the statute of limitations in private 
actions for securities fraud, protects whistleblowers in securities 
cases, and provides that debts arising from judgments in securities 
cases are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
A.  Crimes 
Under SOX, it is now a crime to tamper with, hide, or destroy 
documents with the intent to impede or influence an investigation 
by a United States government agency; the penalties include fines 
and imprisonment for up to twenty years.166  Another newly created 
crime relates to accountants’ maintenance of audit records and 
work papers; accountants are required to maintain all records 
 
 161. Id. § 306(a), 116 Stat. at 779 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. § 306(a)(4). 
 164. Id. § 306(b), 116 Stat. at 780 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1021) 
(amending § 101 of the Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) by adding (i)(2)). 
 165. Id. § 306(a)(6). 
 166. Id. § 802(a), 116 Stat. at 800 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1519). The 
same conduct can often be prosecuted under federal obstruction-of-justice laws, 
but the advantage of the newly created SOX crime is that it is relatively easy to 
prove and carries a stiff sentence. 
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related to an audit for five years after the audit.167  Failure to do so 
may result in a fine and imprisonment for up to ten years.168 
SOX also created a new crime of defrauding shareholders of 
public companies.169  The offense is defined as actual or attempted 
fraud in connection with a security of an issuer170 regulated by SOX.  
The punishment is a fine and up to ten years in prison.171  Under 
the new regime requiring officers to certify issuers’ financial 
statements, it is also a crime for a corporate officer to falsely certify 
financial statements172 contained in a report filed with the S.E.C.173 
SOX amends the existing crime of “tampering with a record or 
otherwise impeding an official proceeding”174 by adding the offense 
of actual or attempted alteration, destruction, or concealment of a 
record or other object to impair its availability for use in an official 
proceeding, or other corrupt actual or attempted obstruction of or 
influence on an official proceeding.  This crime is punishable by a 
fine and up to twenty years’ imprisonment.175 
B.  Criminal Penalties 
In addition to broadening the conduct that is considered 
criminal, SOX enhances sentencing for financial crimes, fraud and 
obstruction of justice.  First, SOX increases the prison sentences for 
mail and wire fraud from five years to twenty years.176  SOX also 
increases the prison sentences for violation of ERISA from one year 
to ten years; fines for ERISA violations are increased for individuals 
from $5000 to $100,000, and for others from $100,000 to 
$500,000.177  Similarly, SOX increases the penalties for individuals 
who violate the 1934 Act from a fine of $1 million and a prison 
term of ten years, to a fine of $5 million and a prison term of 
 
 167. Id. (to be codified  at 18 U.S.C. § 1520(a)). 
 168. Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1520(b)).  See Retention of Records 
Relevant to Audits and Reviews, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8180 (Jan. 24, 2003), 
17 C.F.R. pt 210 (2003). 
 169. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §807(a) 116 Stat. at 804 (to be codified by adding 18 
U.S.C. § 1348). 
 170. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
 171. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 807. 
 172. See supra notes 103-110 and accompanying text. 
 173. Id. § 906, 116 Stat. at 806 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350). See supra 
note 105 and accompanying text. 
 174. Id. § 1102, 116 Stat. at 807 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. § 903, 116 Stat. at 805 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343). 
 177. Id. § 904, 116 Stat. at 805 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1131). 
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twenty years.178  The fine for corporate violators is increased from 
$2.5 million to $25 million.179 
SOX also requests the United States Sentencing Commission 
to review and, if appropriate, amend the sentencing guidelines for 
a number of criminal violations, including financial and 
accounting fraud,180 obstruction of justice and “extensive criminal 
fraud,”181 “fraud and related offenses” committed by officers or 
directors of public companies,182 and violations of SOX in 
general.183 
In an action for an injunction under either the 1933 or 1934 
Acts, the S.E.C. since 1990 may request the court to bar the 
defendant from serving as an officer or director of an issuer.184  
Previously, the standard necessary to impose such a ban was a 
showing of the defendant’s “substantial unfitness to serve”; SOX 
amended the requirement to eliminate “substantial,” basing the bar 
on mere “unfitness to serve.”185  Finally, in an action for an 
injunction brought by the S.E.C. under the 1934 Act, the S.E.C. 
may seek any additional equitable relief that “may be appropriate 
or necessary for the benefit of investors.”186 
C.  Secondary (“Aiding and Abetting”) Violations 
To this point we have considered changes in the law explicitly 
affecting certain securities professionals—accountants, lawyers, and 
analysts.  Before 1994, these persons were frequently sued or 
prosecuted under theories of secondary criminal liability for aiding 
and abetting the primary violations of others (typically issuers).  In 
1994, however, the Supreme Court held, in Central Bank of Denver, 
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,187 that there is no private 
 
 178. Id. § 1106, 116 Stat. at 810 (adding § 78ff(a) to § 32(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. § 1104, 116 Stat. at 808 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994). 
 181. Id. § 805, 116 Stat. at 802 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994). 
 182. Id. § 1104. 
 183. Id. § 905, 116 Stat. at 805 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994). 
 184. Securities Act of 1933 § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2000); Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2000). 
 185. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 305(a), 116 Stat. at 779 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2)) (adding  § 77t(e) to § 20(e) of the Securities Act of 1933 
and § 78u(d)(2) to § 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 186. Id. § 305(b), 116 Stat. at 779 (adding § 78u to § 21(d)(5) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934). 
 187. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
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right of action against one who aids and abets a rule 10b-5 
violation.  Indeed, the language of Central Bank was broad enough 
to possibly foreclose even S.E.C. actions against aiders and abettors.  
To dispel this possibility, in 1995 Congress added section 20(e) to 
the 1934 Act, making it clear that the S.E.C. can sue aiders and 
abettors under rule 10b-5, even though private citizens cannot.188  
The force of Central Bank may now be diminishing, perhaps as the 
result of legislation or perhaps judicial reinterpretation.  The 
Enron, Worldcom and Adelphia cases, in which investors lost 
billions, present a powerful argument for letting private investors 
sue secondary actors who facilitate the violations of those primarily 
liable. 
Section 703 of SOX directs the S.E.C. to study data from 1998 
through 2001 to determine (among other things) how many 
accountants, accounting firms, investment bankers, investment 
advisers, brokers, dealers, lawyers, and other professionals 
practicing before the S.E.C. were found to have aided and abetted 
a violation of the securities laws but were not sanctioned as primary 
violators.189  The Commission is to report to Congress, which, if it is 
sufficiently concerned, could take action legislatively to overrule 
Central Bank. 
At least one court is also trying to avoid the impact of Central 
Bank. In the securities class action arising out of the Enron 
bankruptcy, the court has ruled that “secondary actors may be 
liable for primary violations” of 1934 Act rule 10b-5, as long as the 
rule’s requirements are met with respect to each secondary actor 
and the action is properly pleaded.190  Although the court 
recognized that the 1995 Act was designed to cut back on securities 
litigation by private plaintiffs, the court noted that the 1995 Act “is 
a mechanism for winnowing out suits that lack [sufficient] 
specificity.  It was not meant to let business and management run 
amuck to the detriment of shareholders.”191 
VI. CONCLUSION 
SOX is likely the broadest and farthest-reaching securities 
 
 188. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2000). 
 189. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 703(a). 
 190. In re Enron Corp. Secs. Derivative & ERISA Lit., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 592 
(S.D. Texas 2002). 
 191. Id. at 593 (quoting Abrams v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 435-36 
(5th Cir. 2002) (Parker, C.J., concurring)). 
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reform legislation passed since the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.  Its reach extends beyond merely regulation the issuance and 
trading of securities, to corporate governance and the standards 
applicable to the practice of accounting and law.  SOX is an 
ambitious attempt to add “teeth” to the regulation of public 
corporations.  Ultimately, however, its success will depend upon 
corporate compliance.  No amount of additional legislation can 
guarantee a safe investment environment; in the end, the 
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